The market\u27s evaluation of off-balance sheet banking risk: a methodological reexamination by Hassan, M. Kabir et al.
University of New Orleans 
ScholarWorks@UNO 
Department of Economics and Finance Working 
Papers, 1991-2006 Department of Economics and Finance 
1991 
The market's evaluation of off-balance sheet banking risk: a 
methodological reexamination 
M. Kabir Hassan 
University of New Orleans 
Gordon V. Karels 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Manferd O. Peterson 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/econ_wp 
Recommended Citation 
Hassan, M. Kabir; Karels, Gordon V.; and Peterson, Manferd O., "The market's evaluation of off-balance 
sheet banking risk: a methodological reexamination" (1991). Department of Economics and Finance 
Working Papers, 1991-2006. Paper 57. 
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/econ_wp/57 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics and Finance at 
ScholarWorks@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers, 
1991-2006 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@uno.edu. 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS
 
The Market's Evaluation of Off-Balance 
Sheet Banking Risk: A Methodological 
Reexamination 
M. Kabir Hassan*
 
Gordon V. Karels**
 
and
 
Manferd o. Peterson***
 
Working Paper # 7-91 
ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES
 
Department of
 
Economics and Finance
 
University of New Orleans
 
The Market's Evaluation of Off-Balance 
Sheet Banking Risk: A Methodological 
Reexamination 
M. Kabir Hassan*
 
Gordon V. Karels**
 
and
 
Manferd o. Peterson***
 
Working Paper # 7-91 
* Assistant Professor of Finance, Department of Economics and 
Finance, University of New Orleans. **Associate Professor of 
Finance and ***Marshall Professor of Banking, Department of 
Finance, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
For additional copies of this working paper or a current list of 
the papers available in this Series, please contact: 
Professor Nicholas Mercuro
 
Working Paper Series
 
Department of Economics and Finance
 
University of New Orleans
 
New Orleans, LA 70148
 
phone: (504) 286-6270
 
Not for quotation or attribution without permission of authors. 
All rights reserved. 
COPYRIGHT © 1991 
ABSTRACT
 
THE MARKET'S EVALUATION OF OFF-BALANCE SHEET BANKING RISK:
 
A METHODOLOGICAL REEXAMINATION
 
The empirical literature, to date, has ignored the impact of 
Off-balance sheet (OBS) banking activities on the default-risk 
premia borne by bank subordinated debtholders. This paper examines 
the "market discipline" of OBS activities by employing a contingent 
claims pricing model to the default-risk premia on subordinated 
debt. The standard approach to determine if market prices of 
subordinated debt reflect the risk of default is to regress the 
yield spread against accounting measures of bank risk. This 
approach is inadequate because yield spreads are neither linear nor 
monotonic functions of bank risk. Moreover, this approach fails to 
account for the fact that banks are regulated. Observed yields on 
subordinated bank debt over equivalent maturity treasuries are used 
to compute implied asset variances. OBS banking activities appear 
to reduce both linear risk-premia and implied asset variances. 
These results suggest that bank regulators are overly concerned 
with the risk exposure of OBS activities. The risk-based capital 
requirement of OBS banking activities may be inappropriate. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with the "market discipline" of off-balance sheet (OBS) 
banking activities by employing a contingent claims pricing model to the 
default-risk premia on bank subordinated debt. Theory suggests that OBS 
guarantees may be related to bank risk in three ways. First, for a given bank 
and bank customer, a marginal OBS guarantee must increase bank risk because it 
obligates the bank to make a payment in the future under some circumstances in 
which it would prefer to refuse payment. Second, an OBS guarantee is likely to 
signal reduced risk of a bank customer. Third, OBS guarantees (for example, 
futures contract) may reduce bank risk if these guarantees are used to hedge 
rather than to speculate [Avery and Berger (1988)]. 
Off-balance sheet activities have been growing rapidly In recent years. 
Total off-balance items grew from 1.4 trillion dollars in 1984 to 5.7 trillion 
dollars in 1988. Moreover, OBS activities represented 58% of total bank assets 
In 1984 and grew to 176% of total bank assets in 1988 (Table 1). 
As the volume of off-balance sheet items was increased, bank regulators 
have become concerned that the risks of OBS items could lead to sudden liquidity 
squeezes or surprise losses. Unlike balanc~sheet assets, these potential 
obligations are not funded with balance sheet liabilities and are not considered 
in determining a bank's regulatory capital requirements. Therefore, 
conventional measures of financial health may not present an accurate picture of 
a bank's condition. This situation is likely to change because the Federal 
Reserve System has proposed supplemental risk-based capital requirements that 
specifically include off-balance sheet items such as loan commitments, standby 
letters of credit, and commercial letters of credit in the calculation of 
minimum acceptable risk capital. 
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II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Pettway (1976, 1976a) investigated the accounting factors affecting the 
risk-premium of a bank's capital notes and found that dividend yield and 
earnings growth rate are significant explanatory variables. Cramer and Rogowski 
(1985) investigated the relationship between deposit costs and bank-specific 
risk measures, but failed to find any significant relationships. Baer and 
Brewer (1985) regressed CD rates over various accounting risk measures and found 
that these rates are positively related to risk measures over the period 
1979-82. Hannan and Hanweck (1988) employed survey data on CD rates for five 
different maturities and found that variability of earnings and bank capital ~re 
significant determinants of CD risk-premia. 
Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies (1985) explained CD rates as a function of the 
general level of interest rates and various measures of bank risk including 
standby letters of credit. They found that CD rates rose with increasing 
leverage from increases In SLCs but fell with increases in SLCs as a proportion 
of total risky assets. Since these two factors tend to cancel each other, the 
net effect on bank risk of an increase in bank's SLC exposure is negligible. 
In a paper by Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) a cross-sectioon study of 
subordinated debt pricing was conducted for both 1983 and 1984. Examining the 
spread over the comparable Treasury yields these authors were unable to 
demonstrate the effect of any balance sheet or income statement data on bank 
costs. Recently, Gorton and Santomero (1989) used a contingent pricing model 
and regulatory closure rule to examine the relationship between bank risk and 
accounting risk factors. They found credit and interest risk variables are 
significant in models in which bank debt is aassumed either homogeneous or 
heterogeneous (junior vs. senior) with one year maturity. They attribute this 
4
 
finding to the methodological improvement of their research over previous 
studies. They argue that (i) the nonlinearity of contingent claims pricing may 
not be captured by linear regression; (ii) bank subordinated debt may sometimes 
behave like equity; and (iii) the effects of regulatory closure rules, while 
difficult to capture, are not modeled at all in previous literature. Although 
Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) and Gorton and Santomero (1989) studies do not 
include OBS items as explanatory vaariables, these two studies show the 
appropriateness of default-risk premia and implied asset variances methodologies 
In examining the "market discipline" of OBS banking risk. 
This research reports on two capital market tests of OBS banking risk: the 
impact of OBS activities on the risk-premia of subordinated debt and implied 
asset variances calculated from risk-premia. This research improves upon the 
existing empirical literature in three ways. 
First, the empirical literature, to date, has ignored the impact of OBS 
risk on the dafault-risk premia borne by the subordinated debtholders. Second, 
this study uses contingent claims pricing of subordinated debt to calculate 
implied variance. This procedure is superior to previous studies because it can 
assess directly whether OBS banking risk is correlated with market risk while 
avoiding direct use of the yield spreads which are neither linearly nor 
monotonically related to bank asset risk. Third, this research investigates the 
differential impact of various OBS items on bank risk. 
III. METHODOLOGY TO CALCULATE ons nANKING RISK 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
One limitation of empirical research on OBS risk in banking is that equity 
risk has been used extensively as a proxy for bank risk, thus ignoring the 
impact of bank regulation on risk measurement. In fact, total asset risk is a 
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better measure of risk for regulated banking firms because both equity and 
debtholders of regulated banking firms benefit from deposit insurance and other 
regulatory practices. This study overcomes these drawbacks by using an explicit 
pricing formula for bank subordinated debt that incorporates a default 
risk-premia. 
The empirical methodology used in this study is in the spirit of Gorton and 
Santomero (1989). Asset variances of banks are estimated by inverting an option 
pricing model of default risk-premia of subordinated debt. This approach to 
/ 
risk calculation considers the fact that subordinated debt sometimes behaves 
like equity and sometimes behaves like debt. This contingent claims pricing 
model of subordinated debt also considers the nonlinear relationship between 
market measures of risk and on and off-balance measures of risk. Moreove~, 
subordinated debt pricing considers the fact that banks are regulated. 
3.2 TITE VALUATION OF ASSET VARIANCE FROM DEFAULT RISK-PREMIA 
The contingent claims valuation model, derived by Black and Scholes (1973), 
was applied by Merton (1974) to liability pricing in the case of a single issue 
of nonconvertible debt. In reality, capital structures involve equity and 
multiple issues of callable non-convertible sinking fund coupon debt of 
different maturities and possibly different pricing mechanisms. The contingent 
claims valuation theory is not rich enough to capture many aspects of real world 
securities. Nonetheless, empirical tests in this research are based upon 
contingent claims pricing of subordinated debt as developed by Merton (1974). 
If a firm finances itself solely with pure discount debt and equity, then 
~Ierton (1974) has shown that the default risk premium on the firm's debt, 
expressed as the spread between the yield on the risky debt (R) and the yield on 
riskless debt (Rf ) of the same maturity is 
6 
R - Rf =- 1N[(V/B) exp (RfT) N (-d1) + N (d2)]/T (1) 
where d1 = [IN(V/B) + (Rf + ff2/ 2) T]/ff~ 
d2 = d1 - ff~ 
where ff2 is the volatility of the logarithm of assets of bank; R is the yield on 
subordinated debt and debentures; Rf is the yield on Treasuries of the same 
maturity; V is the value of the bank's assets; T is the maturity of subordinated 
debt (assumed to be 1); B is the face value of debt; N(·) is the univariate 
cumulative normal distribution function. Note that the risk premium, R-Rf , is a 
function of leverage (V/B) , time to maturity (T) and asset variance (ff2). In 
the case of a homogeneous debt issue, the greater the volatility of the firm's 
assets, the higher the default risk-premium. 
Given the default-risk premium and other necessary information, the above 
pricing formula for subordinated debt is inverted to find the volatility, ff2, 
implied by that default-risk premium. Two volatility measures will be 
calculated. The first volatility measure treats bank debt as homogeneous, 
imposes a one-year maturity and subordinated debt to assets minus insured debt 
as the leverage variable. The second volatility measure also treats bank debt 
as homogeneous, imposes a one-year maturity but uses subordinated debt plus OBS 
debt to assets minus insured debt as the leverage variable. 
Calculations of implied asset variances require the usual assumptions made 
by Black-Scholes. A maintained assumption of the Black-Scholes option pricing 
model is that ff2 is constant and normally distributed. The applicability of 
contingent claims model in discrete time has been demonstrated by Gorton and 
Santomero (1989) in their "market discipline" study of bank risk. Moreover, the 
interest rate is assumed to be nonstochastic. Ronn and Verma (1986) show that 
relative contribution of interest rate variance to overall variance appears 
small. 
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In addition, the following assumptions are used for calculations of implied 
variances. 
1. Deposit insurance is fairly priced; 
2. Aggregation of a bank's multiple issues of subordinated debt by 
weighted average of yields and maturities is a good approximation. 
3. Insured bank debt has the same maturity as subordinated debt. 
The assumption that deposit insurance is fairly priced has received 
empirical support from Pennachi (1987). The fact that some banks have multiple 
issues of debt with different maturities necessitates the second assumption. 
The maturity assumption is necessitated by the fact that the banks in the sample 
have widely varying average maturities of their subordinated debt. Core 
deposits are perpetual and the remainder debt has an estimated maturity based on 
turnover measures (Flannery and James, 1984). Although some measure of the 
maturity of insured deposits is acceptable, there is no standard maturity 
measure for subordinated debt. 
3.3 REGULATORY CLOSURE RULE AND MATURITY OF DEBT 
An empirical examination of the bank subordinated debt pricing model is 
complicated by the fact that banks are regulated by authorities that have broad 
discretionary powers. The FDIC may keep a troubled bank open or it may 
liquidate the bank and payoff depositors. The FDIC may also use the purchase 
and assumption technique of dealing with a troubled bank. An exogenously given 
closure rule can be adopted about the behavior of regulatory authority. Merton 
(1978) assumed that banks are audited each year and banks will be closed if, at 
audit time, its assets to deposit ratio is below one. Ronn and Verma (1986) 
also assume an annual audit with an exogenously given assets-to-deposits ratio 
below which the bank is closed. The maturity of debt, used in this study, is 
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effectively one year because banks are audited each year. At examination time, 
the stockholders have the choice of satisfying the regulatory criteria or 
forfeiting the bank to the regulators. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Subordinated debtholders are subject to a larger risk of loss than 
uninsured depositors. Market discipline by uninsured depositors appears limited 
by (a) these depositors' ability to withdraw funds quickly once a problem 
situation becomes apparent, and (b) by the fact that they typically receive 
de facto insurance coverage when the FDIC uses the method of purchase and 
assumption to resolve a problem situation. In contrast, subordinated debt can 
be a source of funding that cannot be withdrawn during adversity and is 
generally not assumed by the purchasing bank in a purchase and assumption 
transaction. Thus, subordinated debtholders are generally subject to greater 
risk than uninsured depositors. 
The potential of subordinated debt to enhance market discipline is examined 
..	 empirically by analyzing the interest rate spread between subordinated debt and 
treasury securities, and asset variances implied by the risk-premia. Both 
default-risk premia and implied asset variances are modeled as functions of 
various on-balance and off-balance measures of risk. 
4.2 MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
The following risk-premia models are estimated over cross-section and 
time-series data using the generalized least squares (GLS) technique to examine 
the risk-behavior of OBS banking activities. The expected signs of partial 
derivatives appear on each independent variable: 
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+ + + 
R - Rf = f (OBS, LEV, DIV, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE, POR) (2) 
+ + + 
q = f(OBS, LEV, DIV, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE, POR) (3) 
where 
R - Rf = Default- risk premia; 
q = the implied asset variances; 
OBS = Seven off-balance sheet variables constructed from 19 items 
included in the RC-L schedule of the FDIC tapes; 
LEV = ratio of total liabilities over total assets; 
DIV = an index of portfolio diversification (the higher the 
diversification index is, the higher the level of diversification is in the loan 
portfolio); 
ALOSS = ratio of loan loss reserves over total assets; 
AGAP = ratio of net position (total market rate assets minus market 
rate liabilities) to total assets; 
ASIZE = logarithm of assets of banks; 
POR = cash dividends over net income. 
Leverage (LEV), diversification (DIV) , Credit risk (ALOSS), Interest rate 
risk (AGAP), Operating risk (ASIZE) and dividend payout (POR) are all on-balance 
measures of risk, and have been used extensively in "market-discipline" studies 
of bank financial policies. These variables have been scaled down by size in 
order to avoid heteroskedasticity problem. 
Two main effects of OBS banking activities on risk, namely diversification 
and leverage effects, are rationalized in theoretical literature. However, on 
a priori , it is difficult to say which effect dominates. The negative sign of 
DIV variable indicates that diversification by bank loan portfolio reduces total 
risk. The positive sign of LEV variable indicates that leverage ratios of banks 
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increase total risk. In addition, the negative sIgns of OBS variables In 
equations (2) and (3) imply that, after controlling for on-balance leverage and 
diversification effects, risk-reducing diversification effect of OBS activities 
dominates risk-increasing effects on OBS activities. 
Table 2 reports 19 OBS activities from the RC-L schedule of bank call and 
income reports. Seven off-balance variables have been constructed from these 19 
OBS items. 
4.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
This research focuses on the 100 largest U.S. banks and BHCs, as these are 
only ones with publicly traded subordinated debt and debentures. Data on yield 
measures were gathered on all BHC for bank subordinated debt, debentures and 
capital notes which were publicly traded in the NYSE, ~ffiX, NASDAQ with quoted 
sale and bid prices from Moody's and Standard and Poor's bond manuals as of year 
ends 1984 through 1988. To make each BHC debt issue as homogeneous as possible, 
all zero coupon issues and floating rate issues were dropped from the sample. 
This produced 171 issues for 50 BHCs in 1984, 137 issues for 49 BHCs in 1985, 
160 issues for 48 BHCs in 1986, 174 issues for 43 BHCs in 1987 and 223 issues 
for 49 banks in 1988. Virtually all of these bonds were issued against the BHCs 
rather than the bank. There was a fair amount of heterogeneity in terms of 
maturity, coupons and issue size. Acquisitions or name changes of banks have 
been confirmed from Moody's Bank and Finance Manual in order to maintain 
continuity in data collection. 
The risk-free rates of Treasury Securities identical in maturity to each 
debt issue were collected from Moody's Bond Record. Yields of multiple issues 
of a bank's subordinated debts are aggregated to calculate an average yield. 
Risk-premiums were calculated by simply subtracting risk-free rates of identical 
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maturity from the yield measure. The risk-premium used in this study is the 
average premium of all outstanding issues for each BRC for each year. The 
on-balance and off-balance measures of risk are constructed as defined earlier, 
from variables available in the FDIC Call and Income Report for the years 1984 
through 1988. The risk-premia of each BRC is matched against on-balance and 
off-balance measures of risk, and this resulted in a final sample of 32 banks 
and BRCs for each year. The relative size of market risk meaasures, accounting 
measures and OBS variables are show in Table 3. These risk-premia are then used 
as the dependent variables in regression analysis of on-balance and off-balance 
measures of bank risk. 
4.4 ESTIMATION OF ASSET VARIANCE 
The average risk-premium for each BRC for each year is used as the input In 
calculating each BRCls asset volatilities. Values of bank assets are market 
values of equity and book values of debt. The pricing formula (equation 1) is 
simply inverted to find asset volatility implied by the risk-premia. A Fortran 
program was written to solve for unknown asset variance in the non-linear 
. equation of the subordinated debt pricing model. These implied variances were 
then used as the dependent variable in the regression analysis of on-balance and 
off-balance measures of bank risk. 
Two asset variances were calculated. SIG~Ul treats bank debt as 
homogeneous, Imposes a on~year maturity and uses subordinated debt to assets 
less insured debt as the leverage variable. SIG~U2 is the same as SIGMA1, 
except that the leverage variable is subordinated debt plus OBS debt to assets 
minus insured debt, because not all risks assumed by a bank appear on its 
balance sheet. Results are presented using both measures of risk, and they are 
generally consistent. 
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4.5 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Table 4 provides the coefficient estimates of a basic risk-premia model. 
This can be used for comparison purposes to the implied variance models. Seven 
equations were estimated, one for each off-balance sheet group, using pooled 
cross-section and time-series data for 32 banks and bank-holding companies over 
the years 1984-88. All off-balance sheet items have expected negative signs. 
Three of these coefficients are significant at the 17. level (APART, ACLC, ADBS), 
two are significant at the 57. level (ADB, ASWAP) and one is significant at the 
107. level (ACD~Thf). The coefficient of SLC is not significantly different from 
zero. This result is consistent with the results of Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies 
(1985) for Standby Letters of Credit (SLCs) but extends these results to other 
categories of DBS items. 
Variations in the risk-premia on uninsured bank debt are significantly 
correlated with off-balance sheet variables, suggesting the presence of a 
"market discipline." Moreover, bank liability holders view DBS variables as 
risk-reducing. The pricing signal that the banking industry receives from the 
. subordinated debt market appears to be at odds with the regulatory prescription 
about off-balance sheet variables. Those prescriptions require certain DBS 
items be included in the risk-based capital requirement. The risk-reducing 
potential of off-balance sheet variables indicates that bank regulators may be 
overly concerned about these banking activities and should not penalize banks 
for these DBS activities by requiring additional capital. 
The on-balance measures of risk, generally, obtain their expected signs.
 
Both leverage and diversification (LEV and DIV) variables have the expected
 
signs and are significant at the 57. level. The significant negative
 
coefficients of DBS items along with expeted signs of leverage and
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diversification (LEY and DIY) variables also suggest that risk-reducing 
diversificqtion impacts of OBS activities dominate their risk-increasing 
impacts. The interest rate risk (AGAP) is positive and significant at the 107. 
level. The credit risk variable (ALOSS) is, however, significantly negative. 
Here multicollinearity between credit risk and interest rate risk (ALOSS and 
AGAP) may be the cause of this perverse sign. The dividend payout ratio (POR) 
variable has an insignificant positive coefficient. The size (ASIZE) variable 
has, in general, negative coefficients and, in one case, is significant at the 
17. level. These results are consistent with studies by Pettway (1976), and Lee 
and Brewer (1987). 
Table 5 reports the results of regression coefficients when the dependent 
variable is the direct risk measure. SIGa~l is the implied asset variance 
derived from a subordinated debt option pricing model. Again all of the 
off-balance sheet variables have negative coefficients. Four out of seven 
estimated coefficients are significant at the 17. level (AOB, ASLC, ASWAP, AOBS) , 
one is significant at the 57. level (APART), one is significant at the 107. level 
(ACO~~I), and the coefficient of ACLC is not significantly different from zero. 
These results again support the risk-reducing nature of OBS banking activities. 
The expected positive coefficient for leverage (LEY) and expected negative 
coefficient for diversification (DIY) along with negative coefficients of OBS 
variables also suggest that risk-reducing diversification impacts of OBS 
activities dominates risk-increasing impact of these activities. 
All coefficients of the on-balance measures of accounting risk variables 
except one have the expected sign. The coefficients on interest rate risk 
(AGAP) are significantly positive. The coefficients on credit risk (ALOSS) have 
the wrong sign and this is likely due to the multicollinearity between credit 
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risk and inteest rate risk (ALOSS and AGAP) variables. The coefficients on size 
(ASIZE) are significantly negative. The coefficients on dividend payout ratio 
(POR) are not significantly different from zero. 
Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates of off-balance and on-balance 
measures of bank risk using SIG~~2 as the dependent variable. SIG~~2 is similar 
to SIG~U1 except that the leverage variable was augmented by OBS debt in the 
subordinated debt option pricing model. The coefficients of all OBS variables 
except one have negative signs. Two of these coefficients are significant at 
the 17. level (ASLC, ACLC). The coefficients of five OBS variables (ADB, ACO~af, 
APART, ASWAP, AOBS) are not significantly different from zero. These results 
suggest that at least some of the DBS variables are risk-reducing. All 
estimated coefficients of on-balance measures of risk have the expected signs; 
and all but two are statistically significant at the 57. level. 
The regression results for both measures of asset risk (SIG~U1 and SIG~~2) 
are consistent with the results of Gorton and Santomero (1989) for on-balance 
measures of risk but extends these results to off-balance measures of risk. The 
results are very similar to the risk-premia model and suggest that a market 
discipline exists for OBS banking activities, and subordinated debtholders view 
these DBS activities of large commercial banks as risk-reducing. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
"Market discipline" studies of OBS banking risk have addressed the question 
of whether market prices of bank liabilities reflect the risk of OBS activities. 
The standard approach to determine whether market prices of uninsured debt 
contain individual bank risk-premia is to regress the yield spread against 
on-balance and off-balance measures of risk. To date these results have been 
mixed. The uninsured bank debt liabilities are subordinated claims which are 
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not linear or monotonic functions of bank risk premia. Moreover, the underlying 
risk is dependent upon the regulatory closure rule. Without recognizing these 
complications linear risk-premia regressions may be inadequate in addressing the 
"market discipline" question. 
The "market discipline" of OBS banking activities has been reexamined by 
using a contingent claims valuation to derive an explicit pricing model which 
incorporates regulatory closure rules for bank subordinated debt 
(Gorton-Santomero, 1989). Specifically, implied variances have been calculated 
by incorporating default risk-premia into a subordinated debt pricing model. 
These implied asset variances are better than risk-premia in proxying total risk 
because they consider both the nonlinear nature of contingent claims model and 
the impact of closure rules. 
A pooled cross-section and tim~series model, instead of simple OLS, was 
employed to perform the econometric analysis for two reasons. Cross-section or 
time-series data alone (32 cross-sections and 5 time-periods) do not yield 
sufficient degrees of freedom in regression analysis. 
The major empirical findings of this study can be summarized as follows. 
All seven off-balance measures of risk in this study are risk-reducing depending 
on the proxy used for total risk. Four off-balance sheet items (AOBS, ACLC, 
ASLC and ACO~ThI) are always risk-reducing regardless of the proxy used for total 
risk. 
Several on-balance measures of accounting risk also show statistically 
significant correlations with market measures of risk. The pooled cross-section 
and tim~series analysis of OBS banking risk provides better coefficient 
estimates (increased t-statistics) and increases the statistical significance of 
models (increased F-statistics). 
16 
The existing policy proposal to regulate DBS banking risk by bringing them 
into a risk-based capital requirement can be analyzed in the light of empirical 
findings of this research. The results indicate that off-balance sheet 
activities, in general, reduce total risk. While bank regulators are concerned 
with total risk and the probability of bank failures, the risk-reducing 
potential of DBS activities indicates that additional capital requirement of DBS 
banking activities will penalize large banks. 
There is clear evidence of a "market discipline" of OBS banking risk. 
Market participants price these DBS activities as risk-reducing. Therefore, 
regulatory interference in the form of additional capital requirement of OBS 
activities are likely to create distortions in the financial intermediation 
market. 
TABLE 1 
U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS 
AGGREGATE VOLUME OF OFF- BALANCE- SHEET COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES
 
ANNUAL DATA AS OF DECEMBER, IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
 
1984 
Commitments to Lend 495.6 
Futures and forward contracts 
Commitments to buy
Commitments to sell 
(exclude FX) 
40 
28.3 
When issued securities 
Commitments to buy
Commitments to sell 
4.3 
3.5 
Standby contracts &other option contracts 
Obligations to buy under option contracts 2.8 
Obligations to sell under option 
contracts 1.7 
Commitments to buy FX (incl. $US), spot
&forward 584 
Standby LIC and foreign office guarantees
To U.S. addressees 109.8 
To Non- U. S. addressees 34 
(Amount of these items sold to others 
via participations) 15 
Commercial LIC 30
 
Participations in acceptances sold to
 
others 8.4
 
Participations in acceptances bought
 
from others 1.5
 
Securities borrowed 2.7
 
Securities lent 2.2
 
Other significant commitments &
 
contingencies 24.5
 
1985 
542.4 
57.2 
40.5 
4.4 
3.3 
10.7 
5 
735.2 
134.8 
38.2 
18.2 
28.4 
8.4 
0.9 
3.5 
3.1 
57.7 
1986 
570.4 
99.7 
79.6 
9.8 
6.2 
27.8 
11.8 
890.8 
132.1 
35.8 
18.5 
28.4 
5.4 
0.8 
5.4 
4 
70.5 
1987 
611.6 
122.7 
137.6 
2 
2.1 
48.9 
16.4 
1,504.1 
134.5 
33.7 
19.6 
30.5 
4.2 
1.5 
5.9 
4.5 
84.3 
1988 
654.9 
174.3 
234.4 
6.8 
6.6 
.. 67.3 
29.4 
1,683.2 
135.6 
33.2 
19.2 
30.2 
3.9 
0.5 
6.7 
3.9 
128.1 
Table 1, continued 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Memoranda: 
Loans originated &sold during period 
ending this quarter 50.1 75.6 107.7 192.1 280.4 
Loans purchased during period ending 
this quarter n/a nla n/a 15.7 18.7 
Notational value of all outstanding
interest rate swaps n/a 186.1 366.6 714.9 928.6 
Mortgages sold, with recourse 
FNMA &FHLMC residential mortgage loan pools 
0IS principal bal. of mortgages sold 
or swapped n/a n/a n/a nla nla 
Amount of recourse exposure on these 
mortgages n/a nla nla nla n/a 
Private residential mortgage loans n/a n/a nla nla n/a
0IS principal bal. of mortgages sold n/a n/a n/a nla n/a
Amount of recourse exposure on these 
mortgages n/a n/a n/a nla n/a 
Farmer Mac agricultural mortgage loan pools 
0IS principal bal. of mortgages sold nla nla nla nla n/a
Amount of recourse exposure on these 
mortgages n/a n/a n/a nla n/a 
Total, excluding memoranda items 1,438.4 1,953.6 2.471. 3 3,686.8 4,445.9 
Total assets (on- balance- sheet items) 2,492.5 2,707.6 2,907.5 2,955.2 3,064.2 
Source: Call Reports (OCC, Ogilvie, October 1990). 
Notes: 
1. FX = foreign exchange 
2. LIC = Letter of credit 
3. 0IS principal bal. = outstanding principal balance 
Table 2
 
ODS Items (Schedule RG-L Off-Balance Sheet Variables)
 
1. Securities borrowed 
2. Securities lent 
3. Commitments to purchase when issued securities 
4. Commitments to sell when issued securities 
5. Notational value of interest rate swaps 
6. SLC to U.S. addresses 
7. SLC to non U.S. addresses 
8. SLC participated to others 
9. Commercial letters of credit 
10. Commitments to purchase foreign currencies 
11. Unused loan commitments 
12. Commitments to purchase futures and forward contracts 
13. Commitments to sell futures and forward contracts 
14. Obligation to purchase under option contracts 
15. Obligations to sell under options contract 
16. Participations in acceptances conveyed to others 
17. Participations in acceptances conveyed from others 
18. Other significant commitments or contingencies 
19. Loan sold or participated to others 
) 
The off-balance sheet variables consist of the following items: 
OB ~ 3+6+7-8-9+10+11 
CO~~ =12+13+14+15+18 
PART =8+16+17+19 
SWAP = 5 
SLC =6+7-8 
CLC =9 
OBS = OB + CO~ThI + PART + SWAP + SLC + CLC 
TABLE 3
 
Summary Statistics for Accounting Risk Variables,
 
Off-Balance Sheet Variables and Market Measures of Risk Variablesa
 
Variable 
Risk Premium 
Asset Risk (GS) 
Asset Risk (GS) 
Off-balance sheet groups 
Commitments 
Participations 
National Value of Swaps 
Commercial Letters of Credit 
Standby Letters of Credit 
Total Off-Balance Items 
Financial Leverage 
Diversification Index 
Credit Risk 
Interest Rate Risk 
Dividend Payout Ratio 
Logarithm of Assets 
Svmbol Mean 
RPRM .01500 
SIGMA 1 1.55564 
SIGMA 2 .01470 
AOB .97779 
ACOMM .16469 
APART .09618 
ASWAP .32129 
ACLC .01523 
ASLC .07394 
AOBS 1.58013 
LEV .94938 
DIV 1. 74527 
ALOSS .01341 
AGAP .05955 
POR .50910 
ASIZE 16.65717 
Standard Deviation 
.00665 
.35084 
.05095 
.94551 
.24067 
.27160 
.52079 
.01095 
.04687 
1.69662 
.01317 
.67445 
.00956 
.13878 
.74757 
.99929 
a For a sample of 32 commercial banks and bank holding companies over 
1984-1988 periods. 
TABLE 4
 
POOLED TIME-SERIES AND CROSS-SECTION RESULTS
 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: RPRM)
 
l:qual Jon. 
110. Con.tant ADa ACafM APART ASLC ACLC ASIIAP AOBS LEV DIV AChP AI·oss rQR ASIZE .1 F(a, Ul1 
-o.oa 
(-1.88)" 
·-0.001 
(-1.91)" -­ -­ -­ -­ -­ -­ 0.09 (1,15)" 
~,OOOl 
(-1.30)' 0.00002 (2.04)" 
-O.lll 
(-3.26)'" 
•00000 a 
(.09) 
.0001 
( .41) 
.21 5.6"" 
-o,oa 
(-2.01) .. -
. -0.002 
(~1.32)· 
-
- - -­ --­
O.JO 
(1.44)'" 
-0.0009 
(-1.56)' .00002 (1.94)" 
-0.19 
(-4.45)'" 
.00001 
( .20) 
-0.00001 
(-0.15) 
.20 5.4'" 
-0.11 
(-1.20)'" - -
-0.004 
(-10.12)'" - -­ -­ -
0.14 
(l.51)'" 
-0.0009 
(-1.12)" .00001 (1.86)" 
~.20 
(-5.64)" 
-0.000006 
(-0.06) 
-0.00005 
(-0.15) 
.65 39.80·'" 
-0.11 
(-2.15)" 
-
- -
-0.011 
(-0.64) - - -­
0.14 
(1,68)'" 
-0.0012 
(-1.17)" .00001 (1.41)' 
-0.23 
(-4.90)'" 
.00009 
0.0) 
-0.0001 
(-0.30) 
.18 4.al·" 
-0.09 
(-1.49)" -­ - -
.­ .12 
(l.06)"· - . -­
.Il 
(l.n}·" 
-0.0004 
l-.18l .00002 (2.23)" 
. -.19 
(-5.21)'" 
.00001 
(.31) 
-.00012 
(-2.49)'" 
.14 6.61'" 
6 -.Ola 
(-1.20) -­ -­ - - -
-;0011 
(-1.66)" --­
.09 
(1.11)" 
-0.0009 
(-1,50)' .00001 (2.05) •• 
-.11 
(-3.39)'" 
.00002 
(.11 ) 
.00006 
(.14) 
.18 4.fll.··· 
-.083 
(-2.05)" - - - - --­ --­
-.0009 
(2.14) ... 
',09 
(1.15)" 
-o.oooa 
(-1,35)' .00002 (2.09)" 
-.15 
(-2.96)'" 
.000009 
(.09) 
.0006 
(1.15) 
.22 6.03'" 
, 
NOTES: I) 
2) 
1) 
~~ 
RPRH Is tht Innull default-risk prell" on subordlnlted dtbt; 
AOa, AClHi, APAR1, ASlC, AClC, ASWAP Ind Aons reprtltnl ItYen 
off-bllinct shut variables; 
lEY, DIY, AGAP, AlOSS, paR Ind ASrzE reprtltnl flnlnchl !tyu-
Igtl dlY'ulrlcatlon Indu, Intertlt rate risk, crtdlt risk, 
dlv dtnd plyout Ind logarithm 0' lIuts r ..ptctlvtly; 
Nuthbtrs In tht partnthtltl art t-statlstlcs; 
SlgnUlclnct !tYtl: '. 10%; ••• 5:1:; .... 1:1:. 
TABLE 5 
POOLED TIME-SERIES AND CROSS-SECTION RESULTS 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIGMA1)
 
E~u.clon. 
110, COnOl_or !O~ "ClVlM APAMT _ I.$I.C ~ClC .lSI/A! _ACl.II.S~~~U.lL----------'llV ~J{;AL __ JJ.llSS POI _ _A~n~ _ 
~ 
~ '(@,U21 
3,66 
0.31)'" 
-,048 
(-2.9S)-~· 
-­ -­ - - - -­
.61 
( .59) 
-.24 
(-·12.42)'" 
.0004 
(2l68)'" 
-5.95 
(-4.28)'" 
.0034 
0.41)' 
-.10 
(-:5.51)'" 
•19 '69.20.... 
3.48 
(2.63)'" -­
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(-1.31)' -­
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(-.10.90'" .0002(.m -1.66 (-5.20)'" .002 (.95) -.10 (-3.48)'" .76 56,25· .. , 
4.53 
(3.U)·" -­
- - -­
-.63 
<.-. 64) -­
-­
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(,80) 
-.24 
(-12,18)'" •pOOl (2.31)'" 
-7.28 
(-5.55) ...• 
.0028 
0.24) 
-.14 
(-9.31)'" 
.80 ·:72.18· .. • 
5.08 
(4.82)'" - -­ --­ - -
-.12 
(~3.81)·" 
-­
I. '4 -.23 
0,68)" (-12.68)'" .0004 -3.77 (2.73)'" (-2.36)'" 
.0028 
0,21) 
.-.12 
(-7.53)'" 
.n 84.22 ... 
3.39 
U.12)"· 
- - -­ - -­ -­
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(-3.18)'" 
.31 
(.21) 
-.23 
(-11.83)'" .0002 (,92) 
-4.71 
(-2.13)'" 
.0018 
C.80 
-.11 
(-4.31)'" 
.75 .55.8] ... 
HOlES: I) 
2) 
1) 
4) 
5) 
Sll;ll.'~ It thl Innuillud .tlndard dl.htlon or IUlt rlturns 
clleulaltd 'ro. Gorlon-Slnto•• ro (1989) .uuordlnlttd dtbt opllo. 
prlcln; .Ill.odolo;y, 
ADD, ACl»tl, APART, ASI.C, ACLC, ASIIAP and ADOS rtprlltnt seven _.. 
o"-bllanca .httl vlrhble,; 
LEV, plV, AGAP, "LOSS, POR and ASIZE reprellnt financial Itver­
aga, dlvanltl"llo. Indu, lnltrul rite risk, crtdll risk, 
dividend psyout and logultll. 0' autll rupectlvaly; 
Huabarl In lhl parlnlhlSes arl 1-ltatlstlcl, 
SlgnUlclnca ItvII: '. lOX•••• 5Xi .... u:. 
TABLE 6
 
POOLED TIME-SERIES AND CROSS-SECTION RESULTS
 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIGMA2)
 
t:quaCIQnl 
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.0000001 
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(-1.67)" .0001Z (1.92)'* 
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(.011) 
-.oolS 
(-1.82)" 
• 19 ·.4.91 .. 
IIOTES: I) 
2) 
1) 
4) 
S) 
SIGHA:l. h tho Innullhld sllndud d.vlatlon of ....t returns 
calcuhled fro. Gorton-Slnto.ero (1989) .ubordlnlled debt option 
pricing .llhodology "hen tho on-blhnet debt h lugllenlld by 
otf-blhnet debt; 
1.08, ACatI. APART, ASlC, AClC, ASWAP Ind A08S repr...nt stven 
ott-blhnce shut variables; 
lEV, DIV, #.GAP, AlOSS, POR Ind ASIlE repr..ent IInlnc1l1 lever­
Ige, dlvenl"catton Indu, Inler.. t rale risk, credit rhk, 
divIdend p"yout end logarithm of l"lt, rtipecllv.lYi 
Humben In lhe p.nnlh.... are l-sllllltlcs; 
SIgnificance levII: '" IllS, •• " 51, ••• " n:, 
REFERENCES 
1.	 Avery, Robert B., Terrence M. Belton, and Michael A. Goldberg (1988),
"Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk: New Evidence from the Capital 
Markets," Journal of Money. Credit and Banking (June). 
2.	 Avery, Robert B. and Allen N. Berger (1988), I1Risk- based Capital and 
Off-balance Activities," Proceedings of ~ Conference on Bank Structure and 
Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, pp. 261-287. 
3.	 Baer, Herbert and Elijah Brewer (1986~, I1Uninsured Deposits as a Source of 
Market Discipline: Some New Evidence, I Economic Perspectives
(September/October), Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, pp. 23-31. 
4.	 Black, F. and M. Scholes, liThe Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities,11 Journal of Political Economv 81 (May 1973), pp. 637-59. 
5.	 Cramer, Robert H. and Robert J. Rogowski (1985), "Risk Premia on Negotiable
Certificates of Deposit and the Continental Illinois Bank Crisis,11 mimeo. 
6.	 Flannery, Mark J. and Christopher M. James (1984), "Market Evidence on the 
Effective Maturity of Bank Assets and Liabilities,11 Journal of Monev, 
Credit and Banking, vol. 16, no. 4 (November), pp. 435-445. 
7.	 Goldberg, Michael A. and Peter R. Lloyd-Davies (1985), I1Standby Letters of 
Credit: Are Banks Overextending Themselves," Journal of Bank Research 16 
(Spring), pp. 29-39. 
8.	 Gorton, Gary and Anthony M. Santomero (1989), "Market Discipline and the 
Valuation of Bank Subordinated Debt," The Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania, mimeo. 
9.	 Hannan, Timothy and Gerald Hanweck (1988), "Bank Insolvency Risk and the 
Market for Large Certificates of Deposits," Journal of Monev. Credit and 
Banking (May). 
10.	 Lee, Cheng-Few and Elijah Brewer (1987), "The Association Between Bank 
Stock Market-Based Risk Measures and the Financial Characteristics of the 
Firm: A Pooled Cross-Section and Time-Series Approach," Proceedings of ~ 
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of . 
Chicago, pp. 285-315. 
11.	 Merton, Robert C. (1978), "On the Cost of Deposit Insurance When There are 
Surveillance Costs," Journal of Business 51 (3), pp. 439-76. 
12.	 Merton, Robert C. (1974), "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk 
Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Finance 19 (May), pp. 449-70. 
13.	 Pennachi, George C. (1987), "A Reexamination of the Over- (or Under)
Pricing of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Monev, Credit ana Banking, 19 
(3), (August), pp. 340-60. 
14.	 Pettway, Richard H. (1976), "Market Tests of Capital Adequacy. of Large
Commercial Banks," Journal of Finance (June). 
15.	 (1976a), liThe Effects of Large Bank Failures Upon Investors l Risk 
Cognizance in the Commercial Banking Industry," Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis (September). 
16.	 Ronn, Ehud and A. K. Verma (1985), "Pricing Risk-adjusted Deposit 
Insurance: An option-based Model," Journal of Finance, 41:4, (September). 
